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1. It would be useful, at this stage, to think upon what kind of
system the consumer countries could set up in order to give concrete
expression 1.0 their solidarity in the dbvelopment of alternative
resources.
Main outlineS of a price system
The system outlined below refers to the price levels which could be
chosen by the consumer cotnltries as '-points of reference for their energy
policies. Its aim is not that of finding a world oil price likely to respond
to the mutual interests of producers and oonBUllters, but nevertheless it is
olear that any inteITlal choices whioh t!ie consumers make, will have N1 effeot
on the establishment of an equilibrium price level.
The system to be considered must respond to the following objectives:
(a) it must guarantee that under no ,circumstances will decisions on prices
endanger the long-term energy supply development;
(b) the return of the investments deemed necessary to attain t~e degree
of security of supplies considered politically desirable must be
guarenteedJ
(c) it must be possible to maintain or develop production from certain
sources of energy who cost exceeds the level judged acceptable under the
security criteria or, if this is justified, for special reasons.- 2"
In order to attain the first of these objectives, a level of prices
. should be established which corresponda to the cost of the long-tem
development of resources capable of ensuring that the lo~terro
supply is maintained. This will create the necessary prospect60f
stabili  ty  for iTlVestors, in the absence of which they would not carry
ont the necessary investments.
'I'his can be done by fixing a floor price based on a. long-term cost
level, by common accord by .all consumers. This price would be
guaranteed against any threatened drop resulting from deci~ ons by
the prodncers, by an apprcpt"iate protective mechanism which wonld be
ei ther permanent or only used when needed.
The adoption of a common reference price would not i;npedc heal thy
compcti tion bnt would- impede the kind of e~ces8ive competition which -
as witnesSed on the oil market between 1960 and 1970 - under the
facade of short-term advantages .firlally led to a dead-Io~ or to critical
situations. The aim is to establish a situation in which the
elements on the market pl~y their role without compromising the general
interest.
In addition to the economic objectives of guaranteeing a price
covering the long-term cievelopment cost, there is the political objec~ive
of achieving a meaeur~ of independence of imported energy. Under
present conditions, this objective cnllo- for investment in dearer
energy sources which will only be achieved if a
return is guaranteed covering them against a possible drop in the
price of oil. This guarantee would be carriad out by appropriate
mgas1lres for each case, within the limits of costs deemed acceptable,
account taken of the common objective of independence.
A third case io that of those sourccs, the cost ofwhi~h exceed
the acceptable additional cost of securi~ supply: this i9 the case
wi th oonrces of f:.:1erfSY the det'-line of development of which should be
protected for a limited period. Such protection is not a matter
for consumer solidarity. Rather it should be ensured by means of
specific measures the scope of which could be defined on the bards
of the interests to be protected, and the cost of which could be
nharerl on the bardn of the ob,iP.Otives eou~ht and on the 1JRoio of- 3 -
6. . This system would off~rconsumer count~ie6 the advantage of being able
to aohieve a balance between oooperation efforts and the benefits to be
derived from those efforts by each participants.
(a) With regard to ihs solida.:i:'ity to be created within the Community it
would assume the form of:
(i)
(it)
the fixing of a conunon floor price and the adoption of Community
measures to gu.arantee its maintenance;
mechanis;ns enabling the apportionment of costs reBul tL'1.g from
the common effort 1.L."ldertaken, in order to guarantee the advantage
of necessary investments to reach the se~urity ob jectives and a
gre~ter in~ependence;
(iii) with regard to the forms of energ:J where these exceed, the
level necessary to ensure independence, the costs incurred for
their developr.Ie..'1t or maintenance will be apportioned for each
(b)
case and this on the basis of the nature of the objectives so~ght
as well a8 on the basis of the beneficiaries.
(i)
In the fr~ework of a wid~r cooperation;
(ii)
the discrepancies arising from the conditions of energy supply
or from the economic stI"\.lctures could lead to different reference
price levels between countries or groups of countries , for the
application of mechanisms of solidarity:
disparities between these ref~rence prices should not however
lead to an imbalance un the world energy market nor should they
reBul t in a distortion in the competitive position between the
variuus consumer countries;
(iii) the apportionmE:~l.1t of the cost of' the o.ommon effort could only
be proportionate to the benefits derived by each participant
from the efforts undertaken by others.
Such a system , without bemg the basis for a world balance fer oil p:::-ices
would provide the COnStn,iE:"r countries with factors necessary to establish .
negotiating stance vis-a-vis the producers.
By lla"t;ure , it is in conformHy with the current evolution of international
trade whic h tendFJ towards the search for a regular supply for conawnera and
for stable returns fo~ producers.
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